Theory predicts that attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading in the market. This paper tests this prediction by comparing the trading behavior of individual investors in different market conditions. In a bull market, investors suffer more from attribution bias and therefore should be more overconfident and trade more excessively. Using the trading records of Chinese individual investors from January 2005 to November 2008, we find that individual investors trade more excessively in a bull market than in a bear market, where excessive trading is measured following Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2001) . Specifically, we find that in the bull market the securities bought by individual investors significantly underperform those sold in the subsequent periods of one and three months. In the bear market, however, individual investors do not make the similar suboptimal trading decisions as they do in the bull market. In addition, the poor trading decisions made in the bull market are due to poor security selection, and not due to poor market timing. Furthermore, we demonstrate that individual investors turn their portfolios more frequently and their performance measured by market abnormal returns is significantly worse in the bull market than in the bear market. Overall, these results provide strong evidence that attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading in the market.
Introduction
The extraordinary degree of trading activity in financial markets has long been a puzzle to financial economists 1 . It is unlikely that the rational trading needs account for the high volume of trading observed in the equity market.
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To address the puzzle of high trading volume in financial market, Odean (1998b) develops models in which overconfident investors trade more than rational investors and trading lowers their expected utilities.
Furthermore, Gervais and Odean (2001) develop a model describing how traders learn about their own abilities based on past successes and failures and how an attribution bias in this learning process creates overconfident traders.
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In this paper, we use market condition as a natural proxy for the level of attribution bias and test whether attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading in the market.
In a bull market, traders are more likely to experience success and therefore should suffer more from attribution bias than in a bear market. bull, and a bear market, we test the degree of excessive trading of individual investors under different market conditions. We measure excessive trading following Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2001) and find that individual investors trade more excessively in a bull market than in a bear market.
Specifically, we find that in the bull market the securities bought by individual investors significantly underperform the securities sold in the subsequent periods of one and three months. In the bear market, however, individual investors do not make the similar 1 The no trade theorems by Aumann (1976) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982) argue that there should be no trade at all if agents have rational expectations and if the feasibility of equilibrium trade is common knowledge.
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The annual turnover rate on the New York Stock Exchange in 2005 is 103% (NYSE website: http://www.nyse.com) 3 Psychological evidence suggests that people are more likely to attribute their success to their own ability and their failure to external "unlucky" forces. This behavioral tendency is often referred to as self-attribution bias (Langer and Roth, 1975) 4 This is due to the fact that attribution bias exhibits an asymmetric property -the "self-enhancing attribution" for success is more severe than the "self-protective attributions" for failure. See Fiske and Taylor (1991), and Miller and Ross (1975) .
suboptimal trading decisions as they do in the bull market. Second, we calculate the performance of calendar time portfolios of the securities bought and sold and again find that the accumulative returns of the calendar time "Buy" portfolios are also significantly less than the returns of the "Sell" portfolios in the bull market, but not in the bear market. In addition, the poor trading decisions made in the bull market come from poor security selection, and not from poor market timing. Last, we demonstrate that individual investors turn their portfolios more frequently and their performance measured by the average market abnormal return is significantly worse in the bull market than in the bear market.
The dramatic bull and bear markets in our sample period provide us a unique opportunity to test whether attribution bias leads to overconfidence and thus causes excessive trading for the following reasons. First, the successes in a dramatic bull market and failures in a striking bear market are very likely due to market conditions (luck driven) rather than due to traders' own ability. Thus, we can easily measure attribution bias without the complication to distinguish luck verses ability 5 . Second, in contrast to a normal market where both successes and failures are likely to be experienced, traders consistently experience successes in a persistent bull market and failures in a bear market. The difference in the level of attribution bias between a bull and a bear market is expected to be fairly large. Third, the lengths of the bull market and the bear market in our sample are both around one year, which reduces the possibility that investors are learning to be more skilled 6 overtime or that investors come to better recognize their own abilities through more experiences 7 .
Our study provides strong evidence that attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading in the market. Complementing Barber and Odean (2001) and Odean (1999) , our findings support the idea that traders' overconfidence can be an explanation for the observed high trading volume in the market. More importantly, our 5 The cross-sectional differences in past performance among individuals can also provide variations in the level of attribution bias and overconfidence. However, in order to infer the level of attribution bias, one must disentangle the luck component from the skill component that has driven the past performance, which is very difficult to implement. 6 Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2009) provide empirical evidence that trading experiences improve investors' portfolio performance. 7 Gervias and Odean (2001) show that a trader's expected level of overconfidence decreases with more experiences. study provides evidence that attribution bias creates overconfidence and thus causes excessive trading in the market 8 . The trading behavior of individual investors appears to be endogenous to market conditions and potentially have feedback effects to the market by causing more trading volume.
Furthermore, we shed light on the trading behavior of individual investors in a bear market.
The existing evidence on individual trading behavior is primarily obtained by analyzing trading records in a bull market rather than in a bear market [Odean (1999) , Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) , and Barber and Odean (2000) , and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean, 2009] . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data. In section 3, we show the empirical methodologies and results. Section 4 discusses competing explanations. Section 5 concludes.
Data
The data in this study are provided by a nationwide discount broker in China. Fifteen thousand and forty customer accounts are randomly selected from all accounts which were 8 Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) document that trading volume of stocks varies with past returns and interpret the results as higher past returns make investors more overconfident through biased self-attribution. Kim and Nofsinger (2007) compares individual investors' attitudes and preferences toward stock risk, book-to-market valuation, and past returns in a bull market to that in a bear market using aggregate stock ownership data and find mixed results regarding investors' overconfidence. 9 Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) 
Methods and Results
We use market condition as a natural proxy for the level of attribution bias. In a bull market, investors are more likely to succeed and thus suffer more from attribution bias than in a bear market 12
. We measure the level of excessive trading following the methodology in Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2001) . Specifically, we examine whether the securities individual investors bought underperform those they sold in the period subsequent to the transactions. 13 We also use portfolio turnover and market abnormal return of portfolios as a measure of the individual investors' excessive trading. To test whether the level of excessive trading indeed varies with market conditions in the direction as the theory predicted,
we partition the trades of individual investors on market conditions and find that individual investors trade more excessively in a bull market than in a bear market. Our findings provide strong evidence that self-attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading.
The Returns Following Stocks Purchases and Sales
We measure investors' excessive trading following the methodology in Odean ( For each original stock in our trading dataset, we randomly draw a replacement stock from the set of SHSE and SZSE A-shares of the same size decile and the same book-to-market quintile as the original stock.
The average difference of returns between stocks purchased and sold is calculated using the replacement stocks by assuming they are traded at the original trading dates. We repeat the procedure 1,000 times and obtain the empirical distribution of the average return differences between stocks purchased and sold.
Panel A of Table 2 investors trade more excessively in the bull market than in the normal or bear market.
These findings support the prediction that attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading.
Calendar-Time Portfolios of Stocks Purchased and Sold
We calculate the performance of calendar time portfolios of the securities bought and sold as another robust check on the statistical significance reported in section 3.1. The calendar time portfolio method eliminates the problem of cross-sectional correlation among security returns by aggregating the security returns into two portfolio returns each month. For each calendar month, the return of the "Buy" portfolio is the equally weighted return of the securities purchased in the preceding one-month or three-month "portfolio formation period".
Similarly, we calculate returns for the "Sell" portfolio. We compare the performance of the "Buy" and "Sell" portfolios and the results are reported in Table 3 .
With the one-month formation period, the average monthly return on the "Buy" portfolio in the bull market is 0.38% less than that of the "Sell" portfolio (p<0.05). In the bear market, however, the difference between the "Buy" and "Sell" portfolios is not statistically different from zero. With the three-month formation period, the "Buy" portfolio underperforms the "Sell" portfolio by 0.18% in the bull market, but outperforms the "Sell" portfolio by 0.07% in the bear market. The results again demonstrate that individual investors are more overconfident and trade more excessively in the bull market than in the bear market.
Furthermore, the underperformance of the calendar time "Buy" portfolio compared to the "Sell" portfolio reflects the poor security selection of the individual investors in the bull market. Since the returns of the two portfolios are compared in the same month, the timing ability of the investors is not captured by the return differences. Thus, the results suggest that overconfidence, resulting from attribution bias, manifests itself through the poor security selection decisions of the investors in the bull market.
We next examine whether individual investors exhibit different timing ability in different market conditions driven by different levels of attribution bias and thus different degrees of overconfidence. Following Odean (1999), we measure timing ability by examining whether investors' entry or exit in one month predicts the market return of the next month. We first define order imbalance in a month as the value of all the purchases divided by the value of all the purchases and sales in the month. We then regress the market returns in the current month on order imbalance in the previous month:
The regression results are presented in Table 4 . The coefficient beta is positive but not significant in any market conditions. Thus, individual investors do not show poor timing ability in any of the market conditions. Overall, our results suggest that overconfidence, resulting from attribution bias, manifests itself mainly through poor security selection decisions of the investors but not through poor market timing.
Portfolio Returns of Individual Investors
In sections 3.1 and 3.2, we demonstrate that individual investors trade more excessively in a bull market than in a bear market by showing that the securities they buy subsequently underperform the securities they sell in a bull market, but not in a bear market. Odean (1998b) shows that overconfident investors trade more frequently than rational investors and their trading lowers their expected utilities. If attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading as we hypothesize, higher turnover and poorer performance should be observed in a bull market, since investors suffer more from attribution bias in a bull market than in a bear market. Panel A of , where B it is the number of shares of security i bought during the month." (Barber and Odean (2001) ). different market conditions. The monthly portfolio turnover in the bull market is much larger than that in the bear market, and the difference is statistically significant. This finding suggests that individual investors trade more frequently in the bull market than in the bear market. The portfolio turnover in the normal market is lower than the bear market, which is potentially due to the fact that there may be other factors (e.g. rebalancing needs or panic)
that drive the trading in the bear market. Since the level of turnover alone can not signal the degree of overconfidence, Panel B reports the gross and net abnormal monthly returns of the portfolios held by individuals. The gross and net abnormal returns are significantly less in the bull market than in the bear market by 2.22% and 7.96%, respectively. Both the gross and net abnormal returns in the normal markets lie in those between the bull market and the bear market. Overall, the results suggest that in the bull market, investors trade more frequently and perform worse than in the bear market. This is consistent with a higher degree of overconfidence caused by attribution bias in the bull market.
Since the portfolio returns of individual investors can be cross-sectionally correlated, we calculated the monthly returns on an aggregated portfolio by equally weighting the returns of each individual portfolio in each month. As reported in Panel C of Table 5 , the average net abnormal monthly return is -10.20% (p<0.01) in the bull market, -3.59% (p<0.0001) in the normal market, and -2.03% in the bear market. The net abnormal monthly return is highest in the bear market, and it is not statistically different from zero. The average net abnormal monthly return in the bull market is less than that in the bear market by 8.17% (p<0.05).
This concludes again that with more self-attribution bias, individual investors become more overconfident and thus trade more excessively in a bull market than in a bear market.
In summary, Table 5 demonstrates that individual investors turn their portfolios more frequently and their portfolio returns are lower in the bull market than in the bear market.
These findings support the idea that attribution bias creates overconfident traders and thus causes excessive trading.
Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations

Survival Bias
We document that individual investors trade more frequently and perform worse in the bull market than in the bear market. Since the bear market occurred following the bull market in our sample, the different level of excessively trading might be caused by survival bias of the sample in the bear market. In a bear market, investors who hurt their performance through excessive trading can be competed out of the market and only investors who trade less excessively remains in our sample. Hence, the average level of excessive trading can be lower in a bear market due to the survival bias of the sample. In this section, we examine the trading behavior of a subsample of individual investors who make at least one transaction during the last three months of sample period and again show that these investors trade more excessively in a bull market than in a bear market.
We apply the same methodology described in Section 3.1 and examine the difference in the returns subsequent to the transactions between stocks purchased and sold for the subsample of individual investors who make at least one transaction during the last three months of sample period. There are 23.2% of individual traders remaining in the subsample and the number of transactions made by this subgroup of investors is about 60% of that in the original sample. As shown in Table 6 , the results based on the subsample are similar to the original results reported in Panel A of Table 2 . The difference in returns of stocks purchased and sold in the subsequent one or three months are significantly negative in the bull market. In the bear market, the difference in subsequent one month returns after transaction between stocks purchased and sold is not significantly different from zero, and the difference in subsequent three month returns is positive and statistically significant. Therefore, the results using survival bias free sample again show that individual investors suffer more from attribution bias and trade more excessively in bull markets than in bear markets.
Risk Aversion
Benefiting from the rising stock prices, investors tend to be more wealthy in the bull market.
The concept of decreasing absolute risk aversion suggests that an increase in wealth should be associated with a decrease in investors' sensitivity to risk. Hence, it is natural to ask whether the increase in the degree of risk aversion lead to excessive trading in the bull market.
The answer is no. Regardless the degree of risk aversion, rational traders trade only if the expected return from trading is non-negative. Therefore, the differences in the degree of risk aversion alone can not explain our finding that traders hurt their performance more by trading in the bull market than in the bear market. However, our results are consistent with a lower degree of risk aversion in a bull market. Our results are also consistent with a coexistence of greater attribution bias and less degree of risk aversion in a bull market than in a bear market.
Disposition Effect
The disposition effect refers to the tendency of investors selling winners too soon and holding losers too long.
18
Odean (1998a) finds that investors exhibit a strong preference for realizing gains than losses by analyzing trading records of individual investors from 1987 through 1993. Since investors experience more gains in a bull market than in a bear market, disposition effect implies that investors trade more frequently in a bull market. However, disposition effect can not explain that investors hurt their performance more by trading in a bull market than in a bear market without taking into account of transaction costs. We find that the difference in returns subsequent to transactions between stocks purchased and sold is -0.47% (p<0.05) in one month and 0.75% (p<0.001) in three months. Therefore, disposition effect can not fully explain our findings that investors trade more and perform worse in the bull market than in the bear market.
Gambling
One aspect of gambling is risk-seeking, a preference for greater variance with equal or lower expected returns. Kumar (2008) shows that individual investors, at an aggregate level, prefer stocks with lottery features. Thaler and Johnson (1995) show that individuals tend to increase risk seeking after experiencing gains, a tendency referred as "house money effect".
"House money effect" implies that risk seeking by individuals can be greater in a bull market, where they experience more gains. However, excess trading has an effect of decreasing expected returns without increasing variance. Thus, the increasing risk seeking aspect of gambling in a bull market can not explain our findings of excess trading.
Individuals may trade for entertainment, which is another aspect of gambling. In such cases, individuals obtain direct utility from trading itself and may trade even if expected return of trading is negative. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) argue that entertaining benefits from trading attribute to excessive trading by examining survey responses and trading records of 1,000 German brokerage clients. It is possible that entertaining motive of trading is more prevalent in a bull market than in a bear market due to the fact that investors have more wealth, gained from the rising stock market investment, to spare. Entertainment can potentially explain our findings of greater trading frequency and worse performance in the bull market than in the bear market, and we can not fully disentangle entertainment from attribution bias as explanation of the excessive trading.
Conclusions
We test whether self-attribution bias is one mechanism that leads to overconfidence and thus causes excessive trading by comparing the trading behavior of individual investors in different market conditions. Self-attribution bias possesses an asymmetric property -the "self-enhancing attribution" for success is more severe than the "self-protective attributions" for failure. Investors are more likely to experience success in a bull market and therefore should suffer more from attribution bias and trade more excessively. We use different market conditions -bull, normal, and bear as a natural proxy for attribution bias, and test whether investors' degree of excessive trading indeed varies with market conditions in the direction as the theory predicts.
We employ a regime switching model to identify turning points in different market conditions and define a normal, a bull, and a bear market in our sample period. Unlike rational investors, suffering from attribution bias, investors are overconfident and may overestimate the expected returns and trade even when the trading is not profitable. We find that in the bull market the securities bought by individual investors significantly underperform the securities they sold in the subsequent months. In the bear market, however, we find that individual investors do not make the similar suboptimal trading decisions as they do in the bull market. The accumulative returns of the calendar time "Buy" portfolio are also significantly less than the returns of the "Sell" portfolio in the bull market, but not in the bear market. In addition, the poor trading decisions made in the bull market result from poor security selection and not from poor market timing. Furthermore, we demonstrate that individual investors turn their portfolios more frequently and their average market abnormal return is significantly lower in the bull market than in the bear market. Overall, our findings provide strong evidence that self-attribution bias creates overconfidence and thus causes excessive trading. Table 2 shows the average returns of the securities purchased or sold by individual investors in the one month and three months subsequent to the transaction months during the complete sample period and three sub-periods: a normal, a bull, and a bear market. We first calculate the one month and three months cumulative raw returns for each stock purchased (sold) and then take the equal weighted average of the returns of all the stocks purchased (sold). Each trade is counted as one separate transaction if the same stock is purchased (sold) in different accounts in the same month. The statistical significance of the differences between average returns of stocks purchased and sold is estimated using Bootstrapping methodology. *, **, ***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively (two tailed).
Table III Monthly Returns for Calendar-Time Portfolios
This table shows the average returns of the calendar time "Buy" and "sell" portfolios of individual investors under the complete sample period and three sub-periods: a normal, a bull, and a bear market. For each calendar month, the return of the "Buy" portfolio is the equally weighted returns of the securities purchased in the preceding one-month and three-month "portfolio formation period". Similarly, we calculate returns for the "Sell" portfolio. The statistical significance for the differences between the average returns of "Buy" and "Sell" portfolio is obtained using paired t-tests. *, **, ***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively (two tailed).
Table IV Market Timing Regressions
This table reports the results of regressing market returns on the previous month order imbalance under the complete sample period and three sub-periods: a normal, a bull, and a bear market. Order imbalance in a month is defined as the value of all the purchases divided by the value of all the purchases and sales in the month. Beta is the coefficient of the order imbalance and t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Table 5 reports the turnovers and return performance of the portfolios held by individual investors under the complete sample period and three sub-periods: a normal, a bull, and a bear market. We first obtain the beginning-of-month stock holding for each individual in each month using the trade data and the holding information at the end of our sample period. Following the methodology in Barber and Odean (2001) , we calculate turnover as one half of the average monthly buy turnover plus one half of the average monthly sell turnover. The gross raw returns "at individual level" are the value-weighted average monthly returns of stocks in each individual portfolio. The gross raw returns "at portfolio level" are calculated by equally weighting each individual portfolio returns in each month. The gross abnormal monthly returns are equal to the gross raw returns minus market returns and the net abnormal monthly returns are equal to the gross abnormal returns minus the transaction costs. We calculate the transaction costs as the sum of security transaction tax, and commission, transfer, and submission fees. -5.12**** -3.59**** -10.20*** -2.03 -8.17* *, **, ***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively (two tailed). This table shows the average returns of the securities purchased or sold by the individual investors who make at least one transaction during the last three months of sample period. The returns are studied in the one month and three months subsequent to the transaction months during the complete sample period and three sub-periods: a normal, a bull, and a bear market. We first calculate the one month and three months cumulative raw returns for each stock purchased (sold) and then take the equal weighted average of the returns of all the stocks purchased (sold). Each trade is counted as one separate transaction if the same stock is purchased (sold) in different accounts in the same month. The statistical significance of the differences between average returns of stocks purchased and sold is estimated using Bootstrapping methodology. Normal Period *, **, ***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1, and 0.1 percent level, respectively (two tailed).
